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Abstract 
Recently researchers are being encouraged to 
address security and privacy requirements for location 
information. This work contributes to this area by 
presenting CERTILOC, a prototype of a spatial-
temporal certification service that is interoperable with 
representative localization technologies (GSM Cell-ID 
and GPS). Our work is completed with a broad threat 
analysis on spatial-temporal certification services and 
an exposition of legal considerations that can be made 
if used in work scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays a wide range of location estimation 
technologies are accessible to the general public. The 
most well-known location estimation technology is the 
Global Positioning System (GPS), probably followed 
by the cell-based location information provided by 
some wireless networks such as mobile phone 
networks. Supported on their spreading, location-based 
services are gradually becoming a reality. As a 
consequence, location information is more and more 
used everyday. One of the challenges that this situation 
raises is the development of solutions to provide end-
to-end control of location information [1], particularly, 
the development of mechanisms that guarantee user’s 
privacy and location information’s trust. 
This work focuses on the problem of digitally 
certifying the location of an entity at a given time by 
addressing the implementation of CERTILOC. Our 
research builds upon the spatial-temporal certification 
framework developed by González-Tablas, Ramos and 
Ribagorda [2]. We have designed the system to be 
compatible with several localization methods, to use 
existing standards when appropriate and to follow a 
modular design. Besides the value that a real 
implementation provides, our work contributes also by 
analyzing the security of this kind of systems from a 
broader point of view and its legal implications when 
used for workforce monitoring scenarios. 
Related work. During the last decade some spatial-
temporal certification models and mechanisms have 
been proposed in [3, 4], but none of them addresses 
their implementation besides that they focus on specific 
application scenarios. On the other hand, [5] presents a 
proof of concept implementation of a GPS-enabled 
device which sends its location data protected with a 
self generated digital signature. It could be integrated 
in our system as an alternative localization subsystem. 
Paper outline. In Section 2 the main concepts of 
González-Tablas et al. spatial-temporal certification 
framework are described. Section 3 presents the 
principal features of the implemented service. Sections 
4 and 5 discuss the security analysis and legal 
implications respectively. Finally, Section 6 
summarizes conclusions and lessons learned. 
 
2. Spatial-temporal certification services 
 
Spatial-temporal certification services are defined as 
those services that generate, collect, maintain, make 
available and validate evidences concerning the 
spatial-temporal information of an entity [2]. 
Therefore, evidences generated by these services attest 
that some entity was located at some place at some 
moment in time under some specific policy. Such 
evidence is called Spatial-Temporal Certificate (STC) 
and it binds certain Spatial-Temporal Information 
(STI) to some entity. These services find their 
application in non-repudiation scenarios (e.g., in the 
tracking of entities and assets such as mobile workers), 
in location-based billing (e.g., automatic toll collection 
systems for highway usage) and in security policies 
enforcing (e.g., an on-line gambling site require to its 
clients to be located within some geographic area). 
The provision of spatial-temporal certification 
services takes place in several phases in which several 
entities may participate. First phase is certificate 
generation, in which a requester asks for the generation 
of a STC for a specific subject to the spatial-temporal 
evidence generator. This generator issues the STC after 
obtaining the location information of the subject from a 
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secure Spatial-Temporal Information Service (STIS). 
STISs act as location servers but in the model it is 
assumed that the methods they use to obtain the 
location information guarantee its authenticity to some 
extent. Second phase considers the certificate transfer, 
storage and retrieval, so the STC reaches the intended 
receiver. Third phase is certificate verification, which 
is performed by a spatial-temporal verifier. Fourth 
phase comprises the certificate use (the evidence user 
makes use of the spatial-temporal evidence to obtain 
some benefit from a relying party) and fifth phase, 
which does not always occur, comprises dispute 
resolution (an adjudicator decides if the claimant and 
the relying party do not agree). For more details on 
these issues, we refer the reader to the previous work of 
González-Tablas et al. in [2]. 
 
3. Description of the system 
 
Our system addresses the first three phases 
described in the model, as the certificate use phase will 
depend on the application in which the system may be 
integrated and the fifth phase usually takes place in 
legal contexts. The majority of the system’s 
functionalities, grouped in the Spatial-Temporal 
Certification Authority (STCA), are accessible through 
a web interface on the main CERTILOC server (see 
Figure 1) although there is also some functionality 
offered through the PDA’s interface. For the sake of 
simplicity, in our system, the receiver of the evidence is 
the same entity that requested its generation. Once a 
user receives a STC, he may verify it by checking the 
STCA´s signature. 
One of the main characteristics of CERTILOC is 
that it is designed to be compatible with different 
localization technologies. Currently the prototype 
obtains the location information from two spatial-
temporal information services, one for GSM devices 
that uses Cell-ID location method (STIS-GSM) and 
another for GPS-enabled devices such as PDAs (STIS-
GPS). They are the most spread location estimation 
technologies and are representative of the main current 
localization methods, network and terminal-based 
localization respectively. Some remarks have to be 
made about the design of the GPS-based localization 
subsystem. Regarding that GPS-enabled devices locate 
themselves, a PDA module must exist to communicate 
its location to externals. Additionally, taking advantage 
of that, we designed this subsystem as a first approach 
to a distributed spatial-temporal certification service, 
that is, our self-located devices issue self-signed STC 
(simplified certificates referring to themselves) which 
are sent to the central service so a proper STC can be 
issued. For a real distributed service, the device’s 
software and hardware should be reliable enough.  
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of CERTILOC 
 
The STIS-GSM returns immediately a response to 
location requests about GSM devices (immediate 
requests). However it cannot be assumed that PDAs 
will be always accessible to attend to the location 
requests directed to them. Therefore, our system is 
designed such that deferred requests (location related 
requests referring to connection limited devices) are 
served in three phases: first, requests made by users are 
stored by the STCA in a database shared with the 
STIS-GPS; second, as soon as the PDA connects to the 
STIS-GPS, the pending requests are attended and the 
STIS-GPS stores the self-signed STCs issued by the 
PDA in the cited database; third, users access a second 
time to the system to trigger, if possible, the completion 
of their request. Although we plan to integrate in 
CERTILOC a policy based privacy management and 
enforcement mechanism, it is still not implemented. 
The following sections of this chapter explain both 
the design and implementation of CERTILOC. Section 
3.1 contains its functionalities. Section 3.2 describes its 
architecture. On section 3.3, the technologies in use 
and implementation details are shown. Finally, Section 
3.4 focuses on CERTILOC´s timing performance. 
 
3.1 Functionalities 
 
First of all, the prototype can locate devices. A 
client can access the system through the web interface 
and make a location request. The system then transfers 
the request to the appropriate STIS and, when the STI 
is available, it is transferred to the client. If the request 
affects a connection limited device, the client gets 
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instead a locator, which allows him to resume his 
request afterwards if it has been attended. 
Furthermore, the system allows clients to certify 
devices’ location. The STCA, after having obtained the 
STI, generates and stores a STC. Again, if it is a 
connection limited device, the user gets a locator 
instead. The prototype also allows clients to manage 
STC´s lifecycle (download, remove and consult STCs). 
PDA users can generate voluntary self-signed STCs 
at any time through the PDA´s interface. These self 
STC are afterwards used by the STCA to generate a 
complete STC. PDA users can also specify some 
configuration parameters (related to the relationship 
between the PDA and the STIS-GPS). 
Finally, regarding the privacy management and 
enforcement, it is planned (but not implemented) that 
any client responsible of a device will be able to 
manage privacy policies which will specify under 
which conditions a user would allow the processing of 
the STI related to devices the user is responsible of.  
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Figure 2. CERTILOC´s deployment diagram. 
3.2 System architecture 
 
Figure 2 contains the system’s deployment diagram. 
Logic is distributed in two nodes: CERTILOC server 
and a PDA. The STCA is the main component 
deployed on the server. It follows the MVC pattern and 
is structured in three layers: 
• Base platform. It receives user actions and 
makes callings to the essential services. 
• Essential services. It contains the components 
in charge of the main functionalities. 
• External representatives. It contains two STI 
providers, which are the components that 
connect to the STIS (one for immediate requests 
and another for deferred ones). 
Besides the STCA, the entire GSM-based 
localization subsystem and the GPS-STIS are also 
deployed in CERTILOC server node. The certificates 
repository and the database shared between the STIS-
GPS and the STCA are also placed in the server node. 
 
3.2.1 Dynamic behavior.  Following we identify 
the main processes that take place in each request 
(location or certification request). 
Users can make an immediate request after 
logging in the system through the web interface 
(request generation). The “certification & localization” 
module then calls to the “immediate location provider” 
(internal STI retrieving) who transfers the request to 
the STIS-GSM using the O.M.A Mobile Location 
Protocol 3.0 (external STI retrieving). The immediate 
location provider contacts with the location network to 
get the STI which is sent back  to the STCA (STI 
transference). The STCA should enforce then the 
privacy policies defined for the located device (privacy 
enforcement). If the request was for certifying, then the 
complete STC generation process is done and the STC 
is inserted into the database (database updating). The 
result, STI or STC, is transferred to the user (system 
response). 
In case of deferred requests, when the client 
makes the request, it is inserted into the database and a 
locator is sent to the user (request insertion). 
Periodically, the PDA gets securely connected to the 
STIS-GPS (device connection) using Wi-Fi access and 
a self-defined protocol with mutual authentication built 
upon HTTP over SSL. The STIS-GPS looks for 
unanswered requests in the database (request 
retrieving) and if any, they are securely sent to the 
device (request transference). Then, the PDA, which 
has been registering periodically its own STI, answers 
each request building a self-signed STC using the 
closer in time STI (request resolution). Those self-
signed STCs are sent to the STIS-GPS (answering 
certificate transference), which validates and inserts 
Base platform Essential services External representatives STIS 
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them in the database (answering certificate insertion). 
When the client returns to the system and uses the 
provided locator (deferred request resuming), after 
privacy policies are checked (privacy enforcement), the 
STI or the STC built upon the referred self-signed STC 
(complete STC generation) are sent to the user. 
The PDA holder can generate at any time 
voluntary self-signed STCs. These STCs are 
preliminary built when the PDA holder orders the 
certification (voluntary STC initial generation) but 
their signature is generated when they are sent to the 
STCA within the cited certificate transference process. 
 
3.2.2 Security mechanisms. Besides the security 
mechanisms established in the connections between the 
STCA and the STISs, user authentication and 
authorization mechanisms are also integrated in 
CERTILOC. Regarding user authentication, web 
interface currently offers a classical user and password 
access, although the use of X.509 public key 
certificates is planned. PDA holder authentication is 
not considered in CERTILOC, mainly because it would 
lead to a less friendly mobile application. Regarding 
user authorization, currently the system only checks if 
the user´s role (client or administrator) is allowed to 
make the request. In next release, if the action involves 
spatial-temporal information, the system will check 
privacy policies established for the affected device. 
 
3.3 Implementation details 
 
The whole prototype has been implemented using 
Java. The server node runs Ubuntu Linux 6.0.6. Server 
components are running on several web application 
servers (Apache Tomcat 5.5.23). The STCA has been 
implemented using the Struts framework. Related to 
STC generation, we selected OpenSAML 2.0 (currently 
under development) and we followed, as much as 
possible, the SAML based STC structure defined in 
[2]. With respect to data storage, MySQL 5.0.5 is used. 
Regarding the GSM-based localization subsystem, it 
has been emulated using software provided by Ericsson 
[8]. Regarding the GPS-based localization subsystem, 
the STIS-GPS has been built using Java Servlets and 
the GPS-enabled device is a Nokia N95 supporting 
J2ME and compliant with the Java Location API (JSR 
179). For cryptographic operations, we use the 
Bouncycastle API version 1.3.7. 
 
3.4 System performance 
 
In this section we present the time yield of the 
system from the user point of view. We have analyzed 
system performance differentiating the system 
operation with the two localization subsystems (GSM 
and GPS). Table 1 shows the results. 
 
Table 1. Results of time measurements. 
Time  
ID 
Process  Mean time 
GSM-based localization subsystem 
T1 Location request 3.13 sec. 
T2 Certification request 3.86 sec. 
GPS-based localization subsystem 
T3 
From device connection to 
answering certificate insertion  
13.53 sec. 
T4 Voluntary STC initial generation 3.9 sec. 
T5 
Certificate transference (for 
voluntary STC) 
4.97 sec. 
 
3.4.1 GSM-based localization subsystem. Table 1 
shows the mean time for location (T1) and certification 
(T2) requests related to GSM devices. These results 
were expected taking into account the complexity of 
the involved tasks and the available resources to carry 
out them. The difference between the two times is due 
to additional processing needed for composing the STC 
in certification requests. 
 
3.4.2 GPS-based localization subsystem. Table 1 
shows time measures for the essential processes related 
to GPS-enabled devices. Process names used in this 
section are taken from those identified in section 3.2. 
Note that neither request insertion nor deferred request 
resuming processes have been timed, because they 
were negligible compared to the rest of times. 
First of all, time measurement T3 represents the 
time between the PDA gets connected with STIS-GPS 
for obtaining pending requests, and until its responses 
are correctly stored in the server database.  
In case of voluntary self-signed STC, as said on 
section 3.2, the process is divided into two parts, and 
each of them has been timed separately. Time T4 
represents the time in the PDA to create the data 
structure that will be included in the certificate. 
Although this process involves connecting with the 
GPS receiver, it is relatively fast (at least, admissible 
for the user experience). This data structure is stored 
until the next connection to the STIS-GPS takes place. 
Time T5 shows the length of this connection, during 
which the stored certificate is retrieved, digitally signed 
and finally sent to the server. Comparing the times 
obtained for this technology with the previously one, 
times are larger in this case although essential tasks are 
the same (creating data structures, making digital 
signatures and communicating). This result was 
expected, because PDAs have fewer resources. 
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4. Security analysis 
 
CERTILOC´s main security goals are the integrity 
and confidenciality of STI [9]. In this section we 
analyze the main threats that CERTILOC must face to. 
We will use Figure 3 to help in the analysis. 
First threat that CERTILOC must face to is identity 
spoofing. In CERTILOC web users access the system 
through the channel marked as EC1 and they are forced 
to log into the system. Once authenticated, user actions 
take place inside a session whose correctness is 
checked in every request, avoiding then privilege 
escalation attacks. An attacker may try also to 
impersonate the STCA in order to access the GSM-
based localization subsystem (e.g. to illegally know the 
location of a device), but this threat is mitigated by the 
user/password authentication required by the Ericsson 
MPS SDK software. An attacker may also try to 
impersonate the STCA or the STIS-GPS in order to 
access the shared database between them or the STCs 
database. In CERTILOC this threat is again reduced by 
requiring user/password authentication to access the 
mentioned databases. An identity spoofing attack could 
also be performed for both the PDA and STIS-GPS, 
one against each other, in channel EC2. This could 
allow to obtain the STI in an unauthorized way (if 
STIS-GPS identity is spoofed), or to provide fake STI 
(in case of PDA spoofing). For this purpose, an SSL 
tunnel with server authentication is established. Client 
(the PDA) authentication is made within our self-
designed communication protocol. 
Another threat that must be considered is location 
spoofing (i.e. modifications over the STI). This threat 
could take place wherever any STI is involved. 
Satellite signals (EC4) could be intentionally altered, 
and this cannot be mitigated (at least, with public 
GPS). Furthermore, the PDA could be manipulated, 
unless tamper-resistant hardware is used. Besides, the 
transferred STI from the PDA could also be altered 
within the communication (EC2). In our case, 
additionally to the cited SSL tunnel (which could be 
enough) the digital signature made for certifying the 
information also guarantees its integrity. This digital 
signature is also the mechanism used to alleviate this 
threat in the databases placed in the server, although it 
would be advisable to analyze the data introduced by 
users through the web interface (to prevent SQL 
injection attacks). It is important to remark that in a 
real GSM-based localization subsystem it would be 
also necessary to take measures against this threat.   
Other threat to take into account is the loss of 
privacy. This could be achieved in two ways. First, an 
attacker could try to access to confidential data. In our 
system, this could be attempted in all databases and in 
EC1 and EC2 channels. To reduce this threat, all 
accesses to this data are authenticated. In case of the 
data stored into the PDA, it has been protected by using 
only internal memory. Nevertheless, it would be 
desirable to cipher all data storages.The second way to 
achieve loss of privacy could be an unauthorized use of 
the obtained STI (regarding that STI is considered a 
private data when referred to a person). To ease this 
threat, security policies enforcement and management 
mechanisms are planned. 
The last kind of threat considered is denial of 
service. This could be attempted on PDA (e.g., by 
sending a great couple of requests), on satellite signals 
(jamming attacks) or on the server node (by making 
lots of simultaneous requests). In CERTILOC, only the 
attack over the PDA is prevented, because the 
operating system controls the resources consumption. 
Including all of the referred measures would not 
lead to a safe architecture, but to a reasonably defended 
system against external threats. Nevertheless, insider 
attacks could be performed. 
 
5. Legal issues in workforce monitoring 
scenarios 
 
In this section we analyze firstly the authority of an 
employer to monitor an employee using the system and 
secondly the legal validity of the STC once generated. 
It has to be remarked that when a device is directly 
or potentially related to someone, its STI is also its 
holder´s one. This fact is relevant from the legal point 
of view, because the location information of a person is 
Figure 3. Security analysis scheme 
GPS  
satellites 
Smart phone (PDA) 
PDA  
module 
Web 
user 
GPS 
receiver 
PDA holder 
EC1 
EC3 
CERTILOC server node 
STIS-GPS 
STIS-GSM STCA 
EC2 
GSM  location 
network 
IC5 
IC6 
Mobile  
phone 
EC4 
IC1 
IC2 
IC3 
IC4 
IC7 
IC8 
367
considered as personal data, and therefore it must be 
protected (as dictated by [10], transposed in Spain in 
[11]). One of the applications of this prototype would 
be to integrate it in a working scenario, that is, as 
surveillance or control measure. We address this issue 
considering the Spanish law, but they can be easily 
applied to any European country belonging to the 
European Union as they all have as base the same 
European Directive [10]. In the Spanish workers statute 
[12], it is stated that the employer can give devices that 
can be located to the employees as a tool of working. 
Nevertheless, if the employer collected the location 
data of his employees, he should inform them about 
this collection [11].  
In this situation, it is interesting to analyze the legal 
value of STC as evidence within a judiciary process. Its 
validity is conditioned to the strength of the digital 
signature. The digital signature now made by the 
prototype may be considered as an “advanced digital 
signature” [13]. This kind of signature is not enough to 
have the same validity as a handwritten one. To 
achieve this, in addition to the saying until now, the 
whole prototype should be checked as a “secure 
signing device”. This condition should be fulfilled by 
real systems based on this prototype. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The fact that nowadays location information is more 
and more used promotes researchers to address the 
challenges that arise for guaranteeing an end-to-end 
control of this information. The system we have 
implemented addresses the implementation of a 
prototype of a spatial-temporal certification service that 
is based on the model proposed in [2] and is 
compatible with two localization technologies, GSM 
Cell-ID and GPS. This kind of practical research has 
not been commonly addressed, which gives a special 
value to our work. Our work is not only an 
implemented prototype, but also a system whose design 
has focused on dependability. In the system there is a 
modular division of responsibilities and commonly 
accepted standards are in use, which make the 
prototype more flexible. The dependability is also 
reflected in the integrated security mechanisms, which 
do not lead to a complete safe architecture but to a 
reasonably defended system. Furthermore, we analyze 
also the legal implications of using the system in work 
scenarios.  
Though the prototype is completely functional, we 
are currently working in the development of a policy-
based privacy management and enforcement module 
and in extending the prototype to locate RFID labels. 
The main lesson learned from our work is that it is 
viable to implement this kind of systems although they 
have to deal with a great number of complex security 
threats, some of which can be easily mitigated but 
others are difficult to prevent.  
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